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The Second World War wreaked immense destruction on a scale unseen in human
history. An unprecedented number of people died or were killed during the conflict across the
European and Pacific theatres of war. Fighting waged for the better part of a decade, claiming
nearly one hundred million lives, soldiers and civilians combined. American, British, and
Russian forces finally surrounded Berlin in April 1945. Adolf Hitler, the obsessed and
ideologically-driven leader who plunged the world into war, ingested a cyanide tablet and shot
himself in his underground bunker only a week before Germany finally surrendered. The fighting
in Europe finally ended in May of 1945, signaling an end to the bloodshed (Japan would
surrender in August). The surrender of the Nazis, however, did not conclude the work of the
Allies in Germany. An equally daunting task now faced the leaders of the free world: the trial of
Nazi war criminals. While the Allies conducted numerous war trials in the years following the
war, the most famous remains the Nuremberg Trial, conducted by the International Military
Tribunal from November 20, 1945 to October 1, 1946.1 The trial represented an unprecedented
circumstance and changed the face of international law forever. Although the trials inevitably
allowed many criminals to evade punishment, the circumstances surrounding the trial, its
unprecedented nature, and the conviction of major war criminals proved equally important for
the enduring legacy of the Nuremberg Trials.
As the war in Europe entered its third year, Hitler and his Wehrmacht army began to
show signs of weakness. The failed attempt to support their Italian allies in North Africa
combined with the infamous and militarily unthinkable attack on the Soviet Union had, for a
moment, stemmed the tide of Nazi victories. British troops, having survived the harrowing
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attacks of the Luftwaffe during the Battle of Britain, long awaited American troops, and
numerous Russian soldiers finally began to push back against the seemingly undefeatable
Germans. 1942-43 proved to be a monumental period in the fight against Nazi Germany, leading
to the joint-Allied invasion of Normandy in June 1944. As early as 1942, however, the Allies
received reports from occupied states throughout Europe regarding the atrocities wreaked upon
Jews and occupied civilian populations of Europe by the Nazis.2 These reports detailed the
systematic extermination of Jews, specifically in Nazi-occupied Poland and other Eastern
European states. Later, the Allies learned of Hitler’s roaming death squads, known as the
Einsatzgruppen, who murdered hundreds of thousands of Jews, Poles, Russians, and others
before the creation of the notorious death camps.3 With little inroad into mainland Europe, there
was little the Allies could do but gather information and wait for the invasion of Europe.
As the war progressed and the Allies made headway into Europe, preparations
commenced for the eventual trial of Nazi war criminals. British and Americans officials showed
great interest in these preparations, due to the miscarriages of justice following the First World
War.4 No European nation was satisfied with the prosecution of potential war criminals after the
Great War. The Allied Powers tried only twelve men for war crimes; six received sentences.5
They failed to produce a unified and comprehensive approach to trying war criminals and
suffered for such neglect. Allied officials identified from previous failures three problems any
new war trial must address: 1) lack of a concentrated plan, 2) lack of fact-finding about war
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crimes during the war, and 3) how to procure assumed criminals before the trial.6 The human
rights abuses perpetrated by Nazi Germany during the Second World War forced the Allied
countries to develop a better system to prosecute war crimes, one that would be a blueprint for
generations to come. To ensure that war crimes were perpetrated correctly, Winston Churchill, at
the behest of Polish and Czech governments-in-exile, called for the creation of an organization
which would become known as the United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC) in
1943.7 This commission directed the information gathering of supposed war criminals during the
war, though it held no power to prosecute. While the commission compiled a list of over thirty
thousand possible war criminals, nothing could be done until Nazi Germany fell to the Allies.
Thus, the prosecution of war criminals became a principle war aim.8
The Allies were anything but unified, however, in their approach to punishing war
criminals following the conclusion of the conflict. Joseph Stalin, the Russian generalissimo,
advocated for the systematic execution of fifty thousand perceived war criminals such as Nazi
staff, officers, and technicians.9 In light of Stalin’s human rights record, such a solution seems
less shocking. Likely more surprising to Westerners, however, is that many powerful US and
British officials including Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau Jr. and Prime Minister
Winston Churchill also advocated for the immediate execution of accused war criminals upon
their capture and identification.10 Such a hardline and “unjust” view seems barbaric and reactive
to Americans today, but such beliefs were guided by resentment against Nazi Germany and the
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horrific acts perpetrated therein. As American, British, and Russian troops traversed Europe,
human cruelty was displayed on a scale never seen. The Soviets liberated the first concentration
and death camps in mid-1944 (including Auschwitz-Birkenau and Treblinka), while US troops
liberated camps early in 1945.11 While a full detail of concentration/death camps cannot be given
in this essay, the initial discovery of these horrific creations understandably shook the Allies to
their very core. In addition, over three million Soviet POW’s died or were killed at the hands of
the Nazi’s during the Second World War (over 50% death rate, while most Allied camps saw
<5% death rate).12 It is understandable, if not justifiable, that the initial reaction of Allied leaders
was immediate retribution.
Level heads and a sincere desire for justice ultimately ruled the day, and US officials
such as Secretary of War Henry Stimson convinced President Roosevelt to call for an
international military court to try the Nazi war criminals.13 A more definitive plan was necessary
before the trial could be properly planned, and Lt. Col. Murray Bernays was tasked with
fashioning a comprehensive plan. The most difficult element of formulating a plan remained who
would be charged with war crimes and how the criminals would be tried. Bernays recognized the
delicate balance between lenient settlements with the defendants and cold-blooded revenge,
foreseeing the effects the war trial would have on the denazification of Germany after the war.14
Furthermore, Bernays believed that appropriate measures of justice must be utilized. He offered
a substantial yet unprecedented solution: charge the leaders of the Nazi organizations who
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perpetrated the war crimes (the SS, the Nazi Party, etc.) and charge them with conspiracy to
commit crimes of war and crimes against humanity. This would allow the Allies to convict the
organizations, implicating any members of the organizations, allowing them to be charged with
the organizations.15 While his proposal left problems to be discussed in the coming months (the
plan was initially criticized by several US and British officials), President Roosevelt’s untimely
death preoccupied US officials. The US government gave tentative approval to the Bernays plan.
Truman, now the sitting President of the United States, approved of the Bernays plan, prompting
the British government to support the proposal as well. The Bernays plan would be revised by
Robert Jackson, the chief prosecutor of the trial and used as the basis of the Nuremberg
Charter.16 Both Jackson and the Nuremberg Charter proved essential to the success of the trial.
In 1945 President Truman approached Robert H. Jackson, then an associate justice on the
Supreme Court, to fill the role of chief prosecutor at the Nuremberg Trials.17 Though an
associate justice, he did not hold a law degree (he did attend some law school); Truman
respected his record enough to select him for such a substantial position. He is the only man in
United States history to serve as Solicitor General, Attorney General, and an Associate Supreme
Court Justice. Although his cross-examination skills were admittedly weak (he was bested by
Herman Goering several times during the trial), Jackson performed admirably as chief
prosecutor.18 Jackson understood the importance of the trial not only for the immediate
defendants, but for international trials in years to come. The trial would set a precedent for
international courts in the future and the Allies could not simply hand out convictions without a
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legitimate trial. He cautioned US officials that such a trial could not be taken lightly, stating that
“the world yields no respect to courts that are merely organized to convict.”19 Jackson
desperately desired to see not only that justice was appropriately administered, but also that the
defendants were proven guilty of the crimes for which they were accused. In his mind, this
would add to the legitimacy of the ruling, satisfying those who questioned the legality of such an
international court in the first place. With a prosecutor selected and the war nearing its
conclusion, the focus now shifted to how the trial would be conducted.
One of the major roadblocks to cohesion before the trial pertained to the theory of law
that would undergird the entire ordeal. The Allies swam in uncharted waters; the charges brought
before the defendants, as well as the trial itself, were unprecedented in the international arena.20
Some Allied officials expressed concern over the legitimacy of the trial and the jurisdiction that a
victorious alliance maintained over a defeated nation. To many officials, however, the acts
committed by the Nazis were too heinous to not be punished in some way. Pragmatic natural law
theorists argued the necessity of the court “to protect itself in the face of such unprecedented
criminality.”21 The majority of Allied leaders sided with the natural law theorists, and as the war
ended in May 1945, they developed a charter to guide the International Military Tribunal
conducting the trial.
The Nuremberg Charter consisted of thirty articles stipulating the manner in which the
Tribunal would conduct its trial. Article 6 of the Charter remains the most significant, as it
describes the “war crimes” charged against the Nazi leaders. The Charter described three
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separate categories: 1) crimes against peace, 2) war crimes, and 3) crimes against humanity.22
The Charter also decreed that Germans could be tried “whether as individuals or as members of
organizations,” which allowed the reach of the Tribunal (and future tribunals) to grow
exponentially.23 Crimes against peace consisted of multiple parts, including the breaking of
international treaties and initiating/waging a “war of aggression.” War crimes, the broadest of the
three categories, included the breaking of the laws/customs of war (murder, slaver labor,
mistreatment of POWs) and violence not deemed militarily justifiable. Crimes against humanity
stood as the most damming of the categories. It included “murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, and other inhumane acts against any civilian population.”24 The most intriguing and
far-reaching stipulation allowed the Tribunal to prosecute criminals for acts committed before or
during the war (yet another unprecedented legal act), “whether or not in violation of the domestic
law of the country where perpetrated.”25 Article 10 held equally heavy pronouncements. It
reaffirmed the ideas laid out by Bernays that an organizations culpability extended to its
members.26 Finally, Article 16 gave the defendants the right to defend themselves (legal rights
like that of the US and GB).
Several articles need furthering explanation. First, the Charter made a legal distinction
between murder and extermination. The Tribunal could try Nazi criminals for actions leading up
to the mass extermination of Jews, not just the extermination acts themselves.27 This distinction
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had never been made in an international court of law. A second peculiar aspect pertained to the
recognition of some sort of “universal protection” of human rights, stemming from the natural
rights theory discussed above.28 While this idea of human rights may have existed before the
Tribunal, no international body articulated the ability to punish people for violating such rights.
Finally, the Charter brought groundbreaking changes to international law. It ruled that
individuals are subject to international law and could be tried by a recognized international body.
Additionally, the Tribunal broke with the traditional notion of immunity for those who
committed “Acts of the State.”29 Nazi leaders and soldiers alike who committed war crimes
“under orders” could theoretically be tried and convicted, allowing all potential criminals to be
appropriately tried.
With the Charter finalized, the Tribunal needed to solidify its defendants. Initially, it
settled on twenty-four men, each one representing segments of the Nazi German government.30
Dr. Robert Ley, one of the selected defendants, hung himself in prison before the Tribunal
began, and Martin Bormann, Hitler’s private secretary, was tried in absentia.31 Herman Goring,
one of the top Nazi political leaders, remained the highest profile defendant. Heinrich Himmler
second in command to Hitler, committed suicide months before the trial; Adolf Eichmann,
another key member of the Nazi regime, escaped to Argentina where he remained until Israeli
commandos captured him in 1962 (he was then executed in Israel).32 The remaining defendants
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included Erich Raeder, Alfred Rosenburg, Julius Streicher, Ernst Kaltenbrunner (SS), and other
important Nazi leaders.33 The twenty-one defendants, representing the defeated Nazi regime,
now faced Chief Prosecutor Robert Jackson and the eight Allied judges who would decide their
fate (the USSR, France, GB, and the US each selected two judges). The defendants, many
understanding the futility of their situation, reportedly appeared haggard and scared; devoid of
power, they now face an uncertain future.34 They were charged with four accounts: 1) conspiracy
to commit war crimes, 2) crimes against peace, 3) war crimes, and 4) crimes against humanity.
According to most testimonies, the trial, which dragged on for nearly a year, was quite
dull and difficult to conduct for a variety of reasons. The prosecutors spent most of their time
entering evidence to be considered by the judges, a monotonous procedure that followed
traditional legal protocol.35 While the trial remained extremely tedious and uninteresting, there
were several memorable moments. For example, the Allies called over one-hundred witnesses to
the stand throughout the trial, including other important Nazi leaders or subordinates to gain
information to implicate the men on trial. One of those men was Rudolf Hoess, commandant of
the Auschwitz death camp. Hoess, transferred to Nuremberg on the wishes of Lt. Col. Whitney
Harris, revealed information that stunned and horrified many at the trial.36 His testimony detailed
the extermination procedures at Auschwitz, including the usage of Zyklon B to gas Jews. One of
his most important admissions, however, pertained to a rule that did not require his guards to
participate in the killing process; those who did participate did so freely and without
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compulsion.37 This information would allow Allied officials to prosecute common soldiers for
war crimes at other trials, should they so choose. The trial remained somber and ritualistic. All
the defendants naturally pleaded not guilty to the four charges, and many pleaded ignorance,
arguing that few men knew what other Nazi leaders were doing in other departments.38 This
argument did not sway the judges, however, and after nearly a year, the judges readied their final
verdict (the later recovery of documents from the Wannsee Conference supported the ruling of
the judges, Nazi leaders did have knowledge of an overarching plan).
The court convicted nineteen of the twenty-two: twelve men received death senses, three
received life imprisonment, and four men received ten to twenty years imprisonment.39 Four
other men were acquitted or not charged. Only ten men were officially executed, however, as
Goring followed in the footsteps of Himmler and Hitler, killing himself just before his execution
time (Bormann remained missing).40 After stipulating the punishments, the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg ended. The military tribunals trying Nazi war criminals, on the other
hand, did not end for many years. After the first Nuremberg Trial ended, the Allies implemented
Control Council Law No. 10 which allowed the countries involved in the partitioning of
Germany (Russia, England, France, and the US) to prosecute supposed war criminals inside their
area of jurisdiction.41 Only the United States held legitimate and noteworthy subsequent trials.
Russia imprisoned thousands of supposed criminals but held few true trials; England and France
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likewise held few tribunals.42 In total the Allies tried over 1600 individuals for war crimes; of
those tried, 426 received the death penalty.43 Around 600 faced time in prison, but by the 1950’s,
almost all of the convicted men either had died in prison or were released. At first glance, this
seems like a large number of executions. Comparatively, however, the number is shockingly
low. After the war with Japan ended in August 1945, the US used a similar trial model to try
Japanese war criminals. The Tokyo Trial found nearly 900 Japanese guilty and executed them
based on their horrific treatment of Allied POWs during the war. Seven Japanese leaders also
faced execution for their war crimes.44
In total, less than 500 Germans were executed for their crimes during the Second World
War, which is shocking when one considers the tens of thousands of Germans who manned
concentration and death camps, participated in death squad killings, and rounded up Jews for
deportation, not to mention the abuse of civilians and POWs. There remains no doubt that many
men escaped death or punishment of any form. Why? The Nuremberg Trial and its subsequent
trials failed to adequately connect the Wehrmacht army to the atrocities committed during the
war.45 This left thousands of men who very likely did commit heinous war crimes un-tried.
While historians, such as Daniel Goldhagen, have since implicated large numbers of German
soldiers and civilians, the charge is too little, too late.46 Even so, many historians, politicians, and
officials remain critical of the Nuremberg Trial for its questionable legality and strained ethics.
Congressman Robert Taft publicly criticized the Trials, arguing that Jackson and others used ex
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post facto47 arguments that would not have stood up in a typical American court.48 Others argued
that the Trial undermined Western law and presented a stark contrast to the ideals of the Allied
nations. Criticism of the Trial continued for decades and is still debated in historical and legal
circles today.
While some criticisms laid against the Trial are valid, such as the “double standard”
exhibited by the Allies in not trying Soviet war criminals, the unprecedented nature of the trial
and the crimes committed by Nazi Germany could not have feasibly been dealt with in any other
fashion. When men witness the pinnacle of human cruelty, hear the perpetrators freely admit to
committing the act, refuses to act justly on behalf of the abused, one must question the humanity
of such persons. The International Military Tribunal could not ignore the cries of the millions of
innocent lives slain. The Nuremberg Trial encountered an evil unseen on the world stage. They
could not refuse to act. While it may have been imperfect, many felt that “any punishment was
wholly inadequate” for the crimes committed.49 In the words of Sir Simon Birkett, it was “the
greatest trial in history,” and the Allied leaders who oversaw it understood the gravity of the
situation and recognized that such evil could not go unpunished.50 Natural law, the belief that all
humans have rights (whether one believes they are bestowed by God or not), dictated the
direction of the Nuremberg Trial and for the better. Subsequent international courts followed the
precedent set by the IMT bringing justice to thousands. The people of the world have the
Nuremberg Trial to thank for that.
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